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1. Introduction  
The world is currently experiencing an unprecedented challenge in the form of rising 
CO2 emissions. Steps are being taken to commit countries to alter their behavior, most 
notably, with the adoption of the Paris Climate Accord. When the agreement was signed in 
2015, it pledged 195 countries to adopt NDC’s, which aimed to strengthen decarbonization 
efforts (UNFCC 2020). The purpose is to strive towards limiting global surface temperatures 
to 1.5 degrees Celsius, with an upper threshold of no more than a 2-degree increase 
(Salawitch & Canty 2017). However, since its inception five years ago, the multilateral 
agreement has not fostered the hoped goal of rapidly transforming society. The NDC’s are 
updated every five years with the next period due this year. So far, only four countries have 
committed to updated targets (Climate Action Tracker 2020). The IPCC’s most recent report 
finds that even when current NDC’s are accounted for, efforts are nowhere near enough to 
match the ambitious targets. Human activities are already responsible for the global warming 
of 1 degree, and current projections estimate that the 1.5 thresholds will be exceeded 
between 2032 and 2050 depending on the policy measures that are undertaken. The report 
concludes that in order to maintain the prospective goal of 1.5 degrees, carbon emissions 
will need to be reduced by 45% by 2030 and the world energy systems will need to achieve 
carbon-neutrality by 2050 (IPCC 2018).  
 
In reality, world CO2-emissions are on a different trajectory. Emissions rose by 1.7% 
in 2017 and 2.7% in 2018 (Dennis & Mooney 2018). The IEA’s world energy outlook predicts 
that in the stated policies scenario energy demand will continue to grow by 1% every year 
until 2040. Only half of that demand is to be generated by renewable energy sources (IEA 
2019). This scenario sees the planet embark on an impressive build-up of renewable energy, 
but the rapid development is not enough to keep up with the planet’s sustained global growth 
and subsequent need for energy. The need for transition is urgent and some regions are 
adopting ambitious goals, such as the EU-wide target of reducing emissions by 40% by 2030 
(European Commission 2020). This trend is also happening in developing countries. 
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Morocco, Gambia, Costa Rica, and India have also embraced ambitious climate targets and 
initiated projects aimed at meeting them (Climate Action Tracker 2020). 
  
These efforts showcase the world’s ability to face the imminent challenge. However, 
there is a specific group of countries for whom this change is perceived as both undesirable 
and potentially harmful to economic prosperity. The world’s fossil fuel reserves are unevenly 
distributed and are to a large degree under the control of a handful of countries (Goldemberg 
2012). For countries which possess these resources, their economies can become 
dependent on the income these industries produce. In developed economies with diversified 
industries and higher average incomes, decarbonization efforts are less likely to be 
destabilizing, while the risk is substantially higher for less developed countries that have 
been unable or unwilling to diversify. Becoming dependent on the substantial rents that 
these lucrative industries produce greatly affects their ability and desire to take part in the 
ongoing energy transition. It threatens the very way that their economies are set up to 
succeed. These countries are in principle beholden to, and dependent on, fossil fuel 
industries (Ross 2012).  
 
 National dependence on oil incomes has major implications for how these countries’ 
perceive global climate efforts. Just as oil majors (such as Chevron and ExxonMobile) 
sought to combat effective climate change action by spreading misinformation and funding 
climate skeptic think tanks (Lawrence, Pegg & Evans 2019). Leaders of petrostates have 
also employed tactics to assist the business environment for fossil fuel industries and 
change perceptions to protect their bottom line. US President Donald Trump announced in 
2019 that he would withdraw the US from the Paris Climate Accord, additionally he has 
pledged to revive the coal industry, and his administration has also been hard at work to 
repeal environmental standards and climate regulations (Climate Action Tracker 2020). The 
easing of regulations coincides with the American shale-revolution and the emergence of the 
US as a net exporter of oil and gas in global energy markets. 
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Similarly, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has stated his desire to leave the climate 
agreement and to eliminate the country’s ministry of the environment (Escobar 2018). The 
hesitation and resistance of petrostates’ towards renewable development is also evident 
when comparing the renewable generation capacity of countries in the Persian Gulf. In 2015, 
IRENA found that the oil and gas producing countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, and Saudi 
Arabia had a combined installed wind and solar energy capacity of just 31,2 MW, while 
Jordan, a neighboring country with no fossil fuel reserves, was found to have an installed 
capacity of 213 MW (IRENA 2016). In some cases, these countries’ governments publicly 
aim to embrace the global challenge. In 2019, Saudi Arabia announced it was going to build 
the world’s largest solar farm at a staggering price of $200bn. However, just months later the 
plans were canceled, Saudi Arabia’s attempt to embrace of renewables has not led the 
country to limit its primary industry, the last decade has seen Saudi Arabia increase its oil 
production by 2m bdp (Safi 2019). 
 
These examples capture the challenges that come with dependence on rents from 
fossil fuel industries for countries, especially as they try to adapt climate-conscious policies. 
Despite resistance from fossil fuel producers, the renewable energy transition is well 
underway, and new developments of renewables now outpace the development of other 
energy sources. The scaling up of the industry in the last decade through technological 
advances and economics of scale has substantially improved the price competitivity of 
renewables’ technologies. Solar PV and wind technologies have especially seen their prices 
drop as a result of emerging public and private mega-projects; a recent study conducted by 
Lazard has found that over a 10-year period, their prices have declined by 89% and 70% 
respectively (Lazard 2019). Decreasing capital costs, an increase in investment, 
technological advances, and heightened industry competition are all contributing factors. The 
same trend is also true for less developed technologies, such as off-shore wind. The next 
generation of off-shore wind farms in the UK is expected to be subsidy-free within the next 
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four years (Ambrose 2019).  Off-shore wind is projected to attract major investments as 
prices drop, and the technology becomes a more cost-competitive and attractive investment 
with costs comparable to onshore wind projects (IEA 2019). Collectively renewable 
industries are expected to attract three trillion dollars in investment over the next decade 
(IRENA 2019). 
  
The transition towards renewable technologies is a deep transition, with broader 
effects beyond simply transforming our energy systems. It will fundamentally alter how the 
world sees energy as a commodity with geopolitical, societal, and economic consequences. 
Fossil fuels are geographically restricted to the fortunate few, while renewable energy allows 
countries to reduce their energy dependencies. The transition provides opportunities for 
countries to generate energy domestically and avoid issues related to purchasing energy 
from foreign governments. This is beneficial for most countries as 80% of the world’s 
population lives in areas that rely on fossil fuel imports to fulfill their energy needs (IRENA 
2019). A fundamental truth of energy systems centered on fossil fuels divides countries into 
energy producers and consumers. The transition presents opportunities to build systems that 
foster interdependence and multilateral cooperation. In that respect, the energy transition is 
a gateway to increasing global living standards and promoting sustainability in line with the 
UN’s sustainable development goals.  
 
Transitioning away from fossil fuels also exposes real vulnerabilities for countries 
dependent on wealth accumulated by oil and gas production. Because their economies are 
so dependent on these industries, they are especially vulnerable to falling prices and 
shrinking demand, and the transition also threatens to displace millions of jobs for fossil fuel 
producing countries. In the US alone, energy and energy efficiency industries employ 6.7 
million Americans (Energy Future Initiatives 2019). Many of these jobs are in remote areas, 
where workers may struggle to find new opportunities if industries scale down. Countries 
willing to adapt their economies to face the new realities brought about by climate change 
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can offset some of these negative effects. Developing renewable energy allows countries to 
capitalize by diversification through developing non-oil and gas sectors, while taking steps to 
tackle climate change. In the process, these technologies bring about wider benefits such as 
economic growth and increased employment opportunities outside of the dominant fossil fuel 
sectors. 
 
1.1 Research Aim 
This thesis will take a deeper look at two fossil fuel exporting countries that fall into 
two categories defined by a recent IRENA report. Firstly, the high exposure and low 
resilience category. These countries are defined as dependent on fossil fuel incomes, which 
account for more than 20% of GDP, while also lacking the fiscal and political instruments to 
alter their dependence. Secondly, the high exposure and high resilience category, defined as 
countries dependent on fossil fuel incomes, which account for more than 20% of GDP, but 
with the necessary income and capacity to manage the transition (IRENA 2019). The first 
category makes up the majority of African fossil fuel producers. For this thesis, the country 
under examination will be Angola. The second category is comprised of most of the fossil 
fuel producing Gulf States. For this category, the thesis will focus on the UAE. 
     
This analysis will explore the real vulnerabilities these countries face, by focusing on 
their dependence on wealth accumulated by the production of oil and gas, and on how 
economically exposed they are to falling prices and shrinking demand. To map out their 
dependence, my thesis utilizes key metrics established within the theoretical frameworks 
and scholarly debates centered around energy nationalism and the resource curse. 
Following this, it will provide an analysis of how these metrics are likely to be affected by the 
energy transition and the impacts that transforming energy systems are likely to have on the 
chosen case studies. 
 
8 
Transforming energy systems is a powerful tool to fight national dependence on fossil 
fuels. While the energy transition provides a credible threat to displace millions of jobs in the 
affected sectors and also threatens to shrink national revenues, it also presents 
opportunities. Fossil fuel producing states that embrace these new technologies are likely to 
develop sustainable and robust economies, by increasing non-oil sector jobs and off-setting 
negative resource curse effects; such as Dutch disease effects, corruption and rentier state 
behavior. Thus, renewables present an alternative pathway that holds the potential to hinder 
some of the most adverse effects associated with the decreasing demand for oil and gas. 
Despite these advantages, progress is hindered by the fact that governments rely on these 
industries to support social programs, thus linking these incomes to their ability to obtain 
legitimacy from citizens. This thesis will explore whether a transition has the potential to 
provide opportunities to overcome these issues, and whether credible arguments exist that 
frame the development of renewable energy technologies as a pathway to lessen 
dependence on the often volatile fossil fuel industry. Adopting national plans to diversify 
national economies from fossil fuel dependence should be the goal of all fossil fuel 
producers. For some, however, their reliance on income from these industries hinders them 
from making the necessary changes. The cases this thesis utilizes are chosen because 
these countries are facing issues associated with fossil fuel dependence, while being located 
in areas that are primed to take advantage of renewable energy resources.  
 
The paper adopts the following research question: To what extent are Angola and 
The UAE, countries with differing exposure and resilience, both able to utilize the 
energy transition to lessen fossil fuel dependence and promote economic 
diversification? 
 
2. Literature review 
This section will examine two issues that have become prevalent within the academic 
literature on petrostate development. The resource curse describes how an abundance of 
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natural resources can lead to wider societal and economic impacts that constrain their ability 
to achieve lasting economic growth. Resource nationalism looks at how tactics are utilized 
by various fossil fuel producers to capture a larger share of their resource rents. Tracing 
these issues within the academic literature will allow this thesis to develop a better 
understanding of the broader subject, which will be analyzed further in the later sections.  
 
2.1 Resource curse 
The phenomenon referred to as the resource curse was popularized starting with the 
rise of national oil companies in the world’s oil-producing nations in the 1970s. Since then, 
the resource curse has become a prominent topic amongst scholars interested in 
development and how resource and commodity wealth influences politics and economic 
performance. The resource curse refers to the idea that the world’s fossil fuel-rich nations, 
with a few notable exceptions, have not been able to achieve a level of economic growth and 
prosperity consistent with the vast incomes they receive from developing their resources 
(Frankel 2012; Ross 2012). This is especially true of the world’s oil-producing countries, 
which are twice as likely to experience civil war and have a 50% higher chance of being 
ruled as an autocracy (Ross 2012). Oil is a commodity with very special characteristics, both 
because of its natural scarcity and geographical concentration. Scarcity has led to the 
industry becoming highly profitable, providing extraordinary rents that are accrued to the 
governments and companies that are able to develop it. The likelihood of high rents has 
continuously led to boom and bust cycles with substantial price fluctuations throughout the 
industry’s history. When times are good companies flock to the industry to take advantage, 
leading to eventual overproduction and a rapid decline in global prices (Yergin 2011). 
Resources can propel countries’ economies in boom times but also, in many cases, 
significantly hurt them when boom shifts to bust. Allowing a country to begin utilizing oil rents 
for development enables them to avoid implementing tools traditionally used by states to 
foster capital accumulation – such as taxes – meaning they can rely on the rents to sustain 
economic growth (Shihab 2001).   
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 Developing oil as a resource is very capital-intensive and requires utilizing highly 
sophisticated technologies. While capital-intensive, the industry creates relatively few jobs 
relative to its proportion of national economic output. The jobs that are created require 
highly-skilled workers who are often hard to acquire in the areas where production occurs 
(Winkler 2000). This is especially true in developing countries where oil production is more 
likely to occur in economic enclaves utilizing a high number of foreign workers (Karl 2007). 
Enclaves mean that companies in charge of production become responsible for delivering 
both the equipment used to extract the resource and to provide accommodation and living 
quarters for their employees. Workers living in enclaves tend to have most of their needs 
met by the corporation, thereby providing significantly fewer benefits to the local economy 
and contributing very little towards local economic development (Ackah-Baidoo 2012). Many 
oil and gas producing states rely heavily on imported foreign labor to sustain employment in 
these sectors. The reliance on foreign labor has produced negative effects in countries 
where it has been poorly managed, producing lasting, and rising, unemployment for 
nationals (Winkler 2000).   
      
Countries suffering from the resource curse often rely on resource-led development 
to promote economic growth. Resource-led development is described as a country being 
overly dependent on revenues stemming from a particular export industry to fuel economic 
growth. This is particularly true for states relying on oil-led development. Dependence is 
derived from a country’s relative export of oil as a figure of all exports. Oil dependent 
countries typically see between 60 to 95 % of their total exports earnings stem from oil and 
related mineral products. These countries are especially susceptible to the negative effects 
of the resource curse (Auty 2001). Despite these countries’ resource endowments, they fall 
behind on economic development, when measured against countries with a comparable 
economic performance that lack the same resources. Resource-poor countries, without 
petroleum, grew four times more rapidly than resource-rich countries with petroleum, despite 
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the resource-poor countries having half their savings (Karl 2007). This phenomenon is 
documented by several authors. Auty (2001) argues that since the 1960s, resource-poor 
countries have consistently and substantially outperformed resource-rich ones. When 
examining per capita GDP data from 1960-1990, Weinthal and Luong (2006) find that 
mineral-rich countries, on average, saw annual GDP per capita increases of 1.7%. In the 
same time period, Mineral-poor countries achieved average increases of 2.5-3.5%. 
 
There are also scholars who have been unable to find statistical results that prove 
the existence of a resource curse. Sachs and Warner (1999) find conflicting evidence on 
whether a resource boom results in economic growth, they do instead find some evidence 
that it has led to decreased GDP per capita in some Latin American countries. Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) also question the existence of the resource curse. They apply historical data 
to examine the time period between 1800-2005 and are unable to observe any demonstrable 
effects attributable to the resource curse. Their findings remain somewhat controversial and 
have been disputed. When examining their results, scholars have highlighted flaws in their 
use of data and also criticized how their analysis makes assumptions about the links 
between democracy and oil wealth. When replicating their experiments with the original 
dataset and adopting a new metric – which allows for a break in the effect of oil in the 1980’s 
– linked to the rise of national oil companies, the results change. Anderson & Ross (2014) 
find contradicting results that clearly indicate the existence of a resource curse in oil-
producing countries in their revamped analysis incorporating the new metric.  
 
Authors have arrived at several explanations for why the resource curse might be 
occurring. Scholars have argued that resource-rich countries are unable to achieve lasting 
economic development because of their development trajectories. These countries are 
plagued by unbalanced growth, sustained corruption, rising income inequality, and a 
prevalence of undemocratic regimes (Luong & Weinthal 2006). Leite & Weidemann (2002) 
find that corruption has significant negative effects that are especially evident in resource-
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rich countries and that this is a major contributing factor towards explaining why these 
countries have poorer economic performance. Auty (1997) argues that resource-poor 
countries are under increased pressure to develop and extract land resources, and have a 
subsequent lower tolerance for rent collection and unequal distribution of wealth. The 
scarcity of natural resources also places heightened pressure on using them efficiently, 
thereby increasing market competitiveness. Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that increased 
market competitiveness is linked to increased investment to promote social and human 
capital. Therefore, the lack of natural resources promotes economic diversification that in 
turn, curbs potentially harmful Dutch disease effects.  
 
The Dutch disease refers to the adverse effects that a resource boom could 
potentially have on traditional export sectors (Usui 1997). Dutch disease effects can produce 
slower socio-economic growth and development for countries that are affected (Larsen 
2006). This term is commonly adopted to describe why mineral-rich countries have 
experienced such lackluster economic performances after developing their resources. The 
phenomenon occurs when a boom in exports, and subsequent rise in commodity prices, 
results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The export boom shifts labor and capital 
into the booming mineral sector resulting in other export sectors, such as manufacturing and 
agriculture, becoming less competitive. The lack of competitiveness often results in a 
substantial downscaling of these vital industries (Weinthal & Luong 2006). Usui (1997) finds 
that adopting an expansionary fiscal policy, as Mexico did in response to their oil boom in 
1973, exacerbated the country’s adverse Dutch disease effects. In the Mexican case, the 
fiscal policy was backed by foreign loans to promote investment in the oil sector. The misuse 
of oil rents amidst a lack of a coherent macro-economic strategy was followed by a 
subsequent intensification of Dutch disease effects. These intensifying Dutch disease effects 
resulted in oil revenues being needed to service foreign loans, rather than promoting 
economic development. These findings are contrasted to the case of Indonesia, which chose 
to run a more cautionary strategy centered around increasing budget surpluses. As a result, 
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these policy adjustments greatly insulated Indonesia from Dutch disease effects (Usui 1997). 
Declining exports sectors, especially manufacturing, also significantly affect the labor market 
and leads to reduced demand and supply of skilled labor. Long-term Dutch disease 
exacerbates income inequality and causes lasting unemployment. Rising inequality and 
continuous reduced access to educational opportunities greatly affects a country’s ability to 
sustain economic development (Weinthal and Luong 2006). 
 
However, there are also instances of countries effectively managing their mineral 
resources to achieve positive outcomes. Norway is commonly heralded as the most 
successful country when it comes to actively managing its natural resources (Larsen 2006). 
Through a careful approach, with a strong focus on fiscal restraint, the country has been 
able to turn a potential oil curse into an oil blessing. The country has carefully and effectively 
managed its oil rents to insulate and protect itself from boom and bust cycles, thereby 
maintaining a healthy fiscal balance. Through its effective management, the country has 
been able to circumvent potentially detrimental outcomes, such as Dutch disease effects, 
inflation, corruption and reliance on foreign workers (Larsen 2006). Norway has been helped 
by the state’s strong pre-existing political, social and economic structures. Karl (2007) 
argues that political institutions are vital to a country’s capacity to manage fossil fuel rents 
effectively; this is especially true for countries that are dependent on oil wealth. These rents 
are especially destabilizing to countries in the developing world that have not had the ability 
to develop strong institutions capable of managing them. Mehlum et. al (2006) draw a 
distinction between producer-friendly institutions, where production and rent-seeking can 
coincide in complementary ways, and grabber-friendly institutions, where a weakened legal 
system, ineffective bureaucracies, and corruption result in poor growth and a pooling of 
resources from other sectors into the export sector. These scholars highlight how a lack of 
strong state institutions when a country starts developing its mineral resources can 
significantly increase the likelihood that mineral-rich states turn towards rentier state 
behavior.  
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Rentier states are defined by certain recognizable characteristics. Beblawi & Luciani 
(1987) argue that these states exhibit a strong national economic dependence on substantial 
external rents, which primarily accrue to the government coffers. The reliance on export 
sector rents results in a devaluation of domestic production sectors. Despite being able to 
generate substantial rents, only a fraction of the population’s workers are involved in the rent 
generation. Starting fossil fuel production leads to extremely high rent collection and is 
therefore likely to result in rentier-seeking behavior (Carlos & Weidemann 2002). The 
resources which were initially intended to promote oil-led development, create adverse 
effects that for many states turn into revenue dependence. Industries that should promote 
development instead entice states to turn toward rentier state behavior (Karl 2007). 
     
Ross (2012) argues that the region most adversely affected when it comes to 
suffering from the resource curse is the Middle East. Resource curse dynamics have been a 
major hindrance to the region’s progress. Relative to the rest of the world, the region has 
suffered in areas such as progress toward democracy, gender equality and willingness to 
reform its economy. These characteristics are also prominent on the African continent and 
have affected several fossil fuel-producing countries. Developing oil resources has turned 
into a curse for several African countries. Their access to natural resources have led to 
severe, long-standing, negative effects for their citizens and these effects play out through 
unstable GDP growth, corruption and rapidly declining living standards (Adams et. al 2019). 
Among African countries, the economic contraction of Nigeria was especially severe, where 
living standards and poverty were detrimentally altered since the pre-resource boom period 
(Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2013). The Nigerian example highlights the effects of the 
resource curse and its potential to produce substantial adverse effects. In this case, the 
curse produced long-term economic inefficiency. Funds were wasted by a civil society 
centered around corruption, which in turn provoked a long-term sustained poor economic 
performance. The state gradually weakened and transformed to encompass the previously 
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mentioned rentier state characteristics. Economic downturns in rentier states 
disproportionately hurt the poorer segments of the population, exacerbating income 
inequality, while wealthy elites are still able to concentrate shrinking rents from the sector in 
their hands (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2013). 
 
The atypical characteristics of oil wealth geographical distribution and production 
facilitate the lasting political and economic issues attributable to the resource curse. 
Resource rents are characterized by their vast scale. These commodity rents are also easily 
concealed from the general public and can therefore be misappropriated by governing elites 
(Ross 2012). Democracies tend to have a lower degree of corruption because of the 
increased likelihood that they have stronger state institutions, which are linked to higher 
degrees of transparency and more effective regulations. Conversely, state officials in states 
that have weak institutions are able to obtain these rents through corruption and patronage 
(Kaskende, Abuka & Sarr 2016). Revenues generated through fossil fuel rents also free 
rentier governments from the need to levy taxes from their population, thereby alleviating the 
government of much of their fiscal responsibility to collect taxes; when taxes are not 
collected, this fails to foster a positive relationship of accountability between a government 
and its citizens. This is especially problematic due to the volatility of commodity pricing as it 
pertains to oil rents, which are produced in cycles of boom and bust. These cycles can exert 
great pressure on a government’s ability to maintain budget balances (Ross 2012). 
 
 
 The ways in which attempts have been made to help countries overcome the 
resource curse are also heavily flawed. The existing remedies in contemporary development 
literature relating to this topic are significantly underdeveloped (Weinthal & Luong 2006). 
Common policy proposal provided by economists, such as economic diversification 
presupposes that states possess the necessary institutional capabilities to handle managing 
resource rents effectively. Development institutions that recommend policies such as fiscal 
16 
and monetary restraint and economic diversification are not taking these factors into 
account. They would be effective for states that have a proven track record of managing 
economic resources, however, rentier states do not fall into this category. Weinthal & Luong 
(2006) believe that development strategies should be focused on fostering private ownership 
of resource assets. Doing this increases the likelihood that private companies are able to 
establish a counterweight capable of challenging the state’s behavior. In Weinthal & Luang’s 
view (2006), the involvement of privately-owned energy companies increases the likelihood 
that states are able to build up robust institutions. Privatization of oil assets forces the state 
to adopt traditional institutional tools, such as taxation, in order to obtain a larger portion of 
the resource rents. 
 
2.2 Resource nationalism 
Energy nationalism has been a mainstay of international energy politics in the last 
decade. Resource-rich governments all around the world have reaffirmed their stances 
towards directing economic activity in mineral sectors. This has been done primarily by 
adopting nationalist policies to increase national profits from these industries (Wilson 2015). 
The term energy nationalism encompasses embracing strategies towards gaining control of 
fossil fuel resources. Resource-rich states do this by shifting power away from the 
international oil companies, towards their national companies controlled by the state 
(Bremmer & Johnston 2009). While arguably most prominent in the developing world in 
recent history, it is argued that these characteristics have also historically existed in many 
developed countries which adopted similar policies (Owen 1988; Ulsaner 1989). Resource 
nationalism is usually spurred on during cycles of higher oil prices. When prices increase, 
this leads the host countries to reevaluate their current contracts in order to seek better 
investment conditions and to increase their taxes and royalties (Vivoda 2009). On the other 
hand, a shift towards lower prices is likely to switch the bargaining power back to 
international oil companies who can be more selective of the conditions they are willing to 
accept (Brenner & Johnston 2009). Resource nationalism also holds a strong ideological 
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component because the state is perceived as having a strong operational role in the national 
economy, which it can use to direct its energy resources. Even in cases where this is not the 
case, this understanding can manifest itself in the public conscience which can lead to 
popular resistance if the state is seen to liberalize or open key sectors to the public (Stevens 
2008).     
 
Johnston & Bremmer (2015) identify four separate variations of resource nationalism. 
First, revolutionary resource nationalism is linked to a wider societal reconstruction. 
International oil companies operating in the country are often forced into renegotiations 
under the threat of full nationalization with little compensation. This type of resource 
nationalism is exemplified by Russia & Venezuela. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin 
adopted resource nationalism to consolidate power by bringing privately-owned companies 
back under national ownership (Vivoda 2009). The consolidation of power was seen as 
legitimate by the Russian population, while the liberalization that occurred in the 1990s was 
seen as a power grab by outside forces wanting to control the industry (Stevens 2008). Thus 
the reclaiming of the industry was touted as the nation reclaiming its rightful ownership over 
the country’s rightful patrimony. In the case of Venezuela, the restructuring of the national oil 
company PDVSA under Chavez saw a transition of power away from the technocratic elite 
towards party loyalists (Mares 2010).     
 
The second type, economic resource nationalism is more frequent and usually 
occurs in a more stable political environment. This form of resource nationalism focuses on 
shifting a larger portion of the rents towards national companies. The focus is not on shifting 
control of the resources, but rather on ensuring that the state can acquire a larger stake in 
lucrative oil investment projects. Kazakhstan’s renegotiation of the giant Kashagan oilfield to 
ensure that the state-owned company Kazmunaigas received a larger share exemplifies this 
variant (Johnston & Bremmer 2009). 
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Third, legacy resource nationalism sees the government adopting ideas of self-
determination over oil wealth as central to political and cultural identity (Johnston & Bremmer 
2009). This approach has been adopted in both Mexico and Kuwait to ensure that foreign 
investment is not instrumental to developing the oil and gas sectors. Mares (2010) argues 
that Mexico’s stance towards its energy industries makes it the country with the clearest 
resource nationalist character in South America. The country’s government constantly has to 
balance the potential political backlash of liberalizing the industry with the need to increase 
market competitiveness. Attempts to do so are often met with fierce opposition, both at the 
political level and through popular protests. Fourth, resource nationalism in OECD countries 
is described as a soft resource nationalism focused on using the established infrastructure 
and institutions to impose higher taxes and royalties (Johnston & Bremmer 2009).                 
 
Resource nationalism is often regarded as a continuous struggle between national 
and private interests (Stevens 2009). These competing interests are linked to significant 
political and economic risks for both the companies and countries involved. The countries 
that pursue ‘resource nationalism’ face the possibility of losing out on technology and 
expertise, both of which are often held by the international oil companies (Johnston & 
Bremmer 2009). Losing out on technology transfers can lead to hindered development as 
the state becomes dependent on existing infrastructure to develop new oil and gas projects 
and continue to deliver resource rents. If this process persists, states can be left vulnerable 
in the face of an economic downturn and lower oil prices. When the downturn arrives and is 
felt by the country’s citizens, it can also create substantial civil unrest.   
 
The shift towards resource nationalism is also a challenge to international oil 
companies. They face increased industry competition in the development of new resources. 
In recent years, international oil and gas companies have seen their share of global 
development be reduced because of more competition (Vivoda 2009). 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
This thesis has the primary research objective of mapping out the potential that 
renewable energy generation has in alleviating economic dependencies, lessening rentier 
state behavior and minimizing resource curse effects for countries with a high reliance on 
fossil fuel industries. To achieve this, the thesis adopts a deductive research approach. A 
deductive research approach aims at developing a hypothesis based on the existing 
literature on the subject. From there, a hypothesis is developed further by utilizing an 
appropriate theoretical framework featuring the metrics and data that will be used to test the 
hypothesis. The thesis will utilize a mixed methods research approach for its analysis. The 
rationale behind this methodological approach is that it utilizes both quantitative and 
qualitative data in the same analysis. Conducting research in this way is likely to produce a 
more thorough understanding of certain phenomena that cannot solely be explained through 
the use of one research method (Venkatesh, Brown & Bala 2013). Utilizing this method 
provides the necessary tools to measure both whether our cases are properly aligned with 
the theoretical concepts outlined in the literature review, and to provide a comprehensive 
statistical analysis to underscore the qualitative findings, thereby strengthening the validity of 
the findings. The approach will mainly rely on the academic literature for its qualitative 
analysis, while the quantitative analysis will be based on production data, databases and 
indexes from both academic and non-academic sources.  
 
The research strategy chosen for the qualitative aspect of the analysis utilizes a 
multiple comparative case study framework. Case studies aim to examine phenomena within 
particular contexts. Comparative case studies strengthen this approach by testing a given 
hypothesis against a number of cases and adopting metrics that can be applied in a multi-
case context, thereby strengthening the generalizability of the findings. The quantitative 
section of the research will rely on descriptive statistics to present the quantitative data in a 
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manageable way to underscore and strengthened the findings within the theoretical 
framework outlined in the qualitative analysis.   
  
Bartlett & Vavrus (2017) argue that comparative studies depend on two key 
comparative logical challenges. First, the challenge of identifying specific units of analysis 
that can be used effectively and comparatively to contrast between cases. Specifying the 
units of analysis in this context means choosing both our case countries and metrics in ways 
that fit within the theoretical framework and are useful for further analysis. Second is the 
need to develop a processual logic that is generalizable and can be traced across various 
actors and time periods. For the purposes of this analysis, the time component of renewable 
energy generation makes generalizable findings that are consistent across time harder to 
achieve. The energy sector is undergoing vast transformations that will fundamentally alter 
energy systems. As noted earlier, price reductions and capacity have vastly transformed the 
industry in the last ten years, making this analysis possible today, whereas it might not have 
been if examined in a different time period. It is also important to highlight the many potential 
and real differences that exist between different energy producers. The findings that this 
thesis comes to are not necessarily going to be generalizable to all fossil fuel producing 
countries.    
 
The method of analysis is also strengthened by the diversity between its chosen 
cases. The fact that countries are chosen based on their relative differences, in both 
approach and initial capacity, strengthens the validity of the findings across a larger 
population of cases, by choosing two categories at either extremes with regards to 
institutional capacity and resilience. The thesis attempts to showcase how renewables will 
be a functional strategy on both sides of the resource curse spectrum. This increases the 
likelihood that the findings are generalizable for countries that fall in between the categories. 
The cases are also chosen because of their geographical disparity, which will strengthen the 
validity of the findings. Bartlett & Vavrus (2017) also highlight the importance of context, 
21 
understood as the political processes, economic developments and social interactions that 
occur within each case and that influence the phenomena being examined. The major 
economic shifts that have facilitated the rapid price reductions in renewables showcase the 
importance of highlighting the context surrounding the cases researched. The industry has 
been aided by national and regional subsidy schemes that have fostered efficient progress. 
This also highlights how social aspects affect the cases under examination. Governments 
who see the benefits of diversifying energy systems tend to promote these subsidies.  
 
3.2 Case selection 
This thesis has identified two categories outlined in a recent IRENA report on the 
geopolitics of the energy transition. These categories are selected because they fit well 
within the current theoretical framework outlined in the existing resource curse literature. 
Therefore, they provide a relevant starting point for further analysis. The paper chooses to 
utilize both categories in order to provide a more holistic view on how countries in distinct 
parts of the world, and with differing institutional and financial capacities, can benefit from 
transforming their energy systems.  
     
Category (A) “High exposure and low resilience” is comprised of countries that are 
dependent on fossil fuel incomes, which account for more than 20% of their GDP, while also 
lacking the fiscal and political instruments to alter their dependence (IRENA 2019). For this 
category, the chosen case study will be Angola. Angola is chosen primarily because of its 
relatively global oil production, which accounts for a large part of the country’s total GDP and 
export revenue. Another important aspect is the country’s open alignment with the energy 
transition. Angola has adopted diversification plans that incorporate a substantial 
development of renewable energy sources, and is therefore a viable candidate for studying 
the impacts of such developments in realistic scenarios. The country is also lacking in 
institutional capacity, which has led to cycles of corruption, misappropriation of funds, 
nepotism, widespread embezzlement and authoritarianism (Hammond 2011). These issues 
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ensure that for the purposes of this thesis, the country fits well within both resource curse 
and rentier state frameworks, which will be applied to develop research metrics usable in the 
analysis.       
 
Category (B)  “High exposure and high resilience” is comprised of countries 
dependent on fossil fuel incomes, which account for more than 20% of GDP, with the 
necessary income and capacity to manage the transition (IRENA 2019). For this category, 
the thesis will focus on the UAE. The UAE is, similarly to Angola, also chosen because of its 
vast fossil fuel industries which account for a substantial amount of national revenues and 
GDP. The UAE fits with category B because it has shown stronger institutional capacity to 
manage its resource rent collection in ways that promote economic growth and 
diversification, rather than resulting in outright rentier state behavior. The country has also 
embarked on rapid industrialization to build up its renewable energy capacity. The country 
has publicly announced its willingness to continue building renewable energy sources, which 
it regards as a key development strategy for future prosperity (Nehme 2020). The UAE has 
comparatively stronger institutional capacity, a condition that has led it to avoid many 
adverse resource curse effects. However, the thesis will showcase how resource curse and 
rentier state frameworks still pose credible threats to effective management. This also 
highlights the extent to which renewable energy can (or cannot) boost the country’s 
diversification efforts.  
 
3.3 Research metrics and data collection process  
The research metrics that this thesis will utilize stem from the theoretical frameworks 
highlighted in the literature review and non-academic sources focused on the renewable 
transition. This thesis adopts a mixed approach to ensure that the analysis is able to properly 
examine the relationship between variables. The prevailing resource curse literature 
identifies these factors as resource curse symptoms: 
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1. Rentier state behavior: Identified as government dependence on fossil fuel sector 
rents. State unwillingness or inability to drive economic diversification and a 
persistent prevalence of corruption. 
2. Enclave production, reliance on foreign workers which results in prevailing high 
unemployment for the country’s nationals. 
3. A lack of institutional capacity to control and effectively allocate resource rents 
4. Dutch disease effects: Increasing real exchange rate and/or downscaling and 
diminishing of other export sectors. 
 
These four processes will be handled collectively in the first chapter of the analysis. 
To compare the two countries, metrics such as national revenues, foreign workforce, 
economic diversification, corruption indexes, business environment and investments will be 
used to create a holistic picture of whether these countries encompass characteristics that 
are consistent with the resource curse. This chapter will also explore whether energy 
nationalist policies are pursued to ensure larger sector rents. To outline this section this 
thesis will use both the existing literature, datasets and indexes to underscore the 
quantitative research component.  
 
The next chapter of the analysis section will focus on the respective countries 
renewable energy build-up and the associated benefits that can be achieved by pursuing this 
strategy. This thesis primarily utilizes data sets, working papers and government data to 
underscore the benefits of this approach. 
 
3.4 Limitations and existing literature gap 
There are several potential limitations to this thesis that need to be highlighted. 
Firstly, the thesis is attempting to bridge the gap between existing resource curse theory and 
the emergence of renewables as a major player in international electricity markets. This is a 
topic that, to date, has received little attention in the existing academic literature. This poses 
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both challenges and benefits for the purposes of this paper. Firstly, the lack of academic 
focus on this topic means that there are fewer sources to go on with when composing a 
framework for the analysis. The metrics used in this paper are derived within the existing 
literature, along with additional information derived from non-academic sources. This is an 
imperfect method of conducting research, which can produce suboptimal results because 
there are many potential factors that are not highlighted and because of a lack of academic 
grounding. Undiscovered factors could be, for example, the type of government, access to 
international funding, public resistance to renewable development. These are all important 
aspects in resource curse literature that the thesis, because of the limitations of the paper, 
will not be able to address. 
 
 There are also issues related to the validity of the findings in the thesis. I.E. whether 
the paper is actually researching what it claims to research. As we have noted in the 
literature review, there are opposing views on the resource curse. Some scholars have come 
to conclusions that find no evidence for its existence. This paper is, therefore, using a 
potentially controversial theoretical framework for its analysis, which could impact the validity 
of the findings. The external validity of the findings, whether they are generalizable to other 
settings or groups, also poses challenges. The thesis is attempting to highlight the rise of 
renewables as a prominent development path for resource-rich states. It needs to be 
mentioned that these findings are not necessarily applicable to all fossil fuel producers. The 
viability of renewables is dependent on the country-specific context. Access to funding, 
geographical location and popular support for renewable development are all metrics that 
will differ depending on the country in question. 
 
There are also potential inherent biases in both my writing and the metrics I will be 
using for my analysis. For example, I am relying on IRENA sources for both my conceptual 
framework and some of my data. IRENA is an intergovernmental organization that aims to 
assist countries with the transition towards renewable energy. Their very mission could 
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factor in a potential bias when the organization is presenting their numbers. Their numbers 
could be skewed toward making renewable energy seem a more attractive option. 
 
Despite the paper’s potential shortcomings, I firmly believe that there is value to be 
gained from this analysis. As mentioned, the fact that little attention has been given to this 
issue in the existing literature provides an opportunity to add a new dimension – namely, the 
effects of the rise of renewables on countries that are plagued by the resources curse – to 
potentially modify the existing theoretical framework on the resource curse by adding new 
elements that have not yet been extensively researched. I am also confident that despite the 
need for careful country-specific analysis, the findings will present a viable pathway for fossil 
fuel exporting countries, that deserves to be explored further in future analyses.    
  
4. Analysis 
4.1 Case A – High exposure, low resilience – Angola  
Hamilton (2011) argues that Angola is a classic example when it comes to a country 
exhibiting resource curse symptoms. Angola’s resource curse is epitomized by several 
factors. A long-lasting civil war, which was exacerbated by competition between rebel forces 
for power over natural resources, undemocratic governance, widespread poverty, corruption 
and a centralized power elite unwilling to pursue economic diversification (Amundsen 2014). 
Angola has access to vast oil revenues, but is hindered by a corrupt and authoritarian 
government, which fails to provide welfare that can benefit its people. Angola is Africa’s 
second-biggest oil producer with oil and gas products representing 94% of export revenue, 
52% of government revenue and 30% of GDP (African Development Bank 2017). Oil from 
Angola is mostly offshore, as are most other oil and gas sources in the Gulf of Guinea. Oil 
from this region is considered to be of high quality and is therefore very attractive to buyers 
on global oil markets (Hamilton 2011).  
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Angola discovered their oil in 1955 and began developing the resource while still 
under Portuguese colonial rule. The colonial rulers, which had previously emphasized raw 
materials, shifted their focus to instead make the most out of the new resource. The 
development of the new sector also coincided with the Angolan struggle for independence. 
The country achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, after a 13-year struggle. Upon 
gaining independence, the country immediately established the national oil company, 
Sonangol, based on the previously Portuguese controlled SACOR. The NOC became the 
sole national entity with authority to grant concessions for oil exploration and production 
(Burgos & Ear 2012). The ambition to do this stems from the events that transpired with the 
1973 oil embargo. The profitability of the national oil sector was radically transformed and 
became the country’s primary export industry, accounting for 30% of exports (Hamilton 
2011). However, the new nation was not able to maintain stability and fell into a brutal civil 
war just two years later, which over the course of the fighting saw 1 million Angola's perish. 
The fighting would last for 27 years until peace was restored with the death of rebel leader 
Jonas Savimbi in 2002 (Olivera 2015). The war became embroiled within the cold war 
struggle for global hegemony, becoming an arena for proxy warfare with both global 
superpowers backing different military forces. Oil and diamonds were vital to keeping the 
fighting going for the competing militant groups, as both sides in the conflict relied on these 
revenues to be able to maintain their armies (Frynas & Wood 2001). This is a condition 
typical of resource cursed countries. Since the 1980s oil revenues have been shown to 
increase the likelihood of civil war, with low- and middle- income countries being especially 
susceptible. These countries are twice as likely to experience civil war when compared to 
non-oil producers (Ross 2012).   
 
Olivera (2015) argues that the period after the civil war saw Angola embark on one of 
the most intensive reconstructions in recent history. The country’s economy embarked on 
rapid industrialization and managed to more than triple the size of their economy when 
measured in PPP $. The economy rose from 62 billion in 2002 to 197 billion in 2018 (IMF 
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2018). From 2003, the country witnessed massive structural and economic development, 
especially in Luanda, where the urbanization boom turned the capital into a modernized city 
(Burgos & Ear 2012). This impressive rise was helped immensely by a sustained period of 
unprecedentedly high oil prices in the early 2000s leading up to the financial crisis. In the 
years between 2002 and 2007 Angola more than doubled its oil production and became an 
OPEC member. The country’s output increased from 700.000 bpd in 2000 to 1,7 million bpd 
by 2007 (IEA 2020). This is also the period when the country was able to achieve its peak oil 
production. Since then, however, progress on developing new oil fields has been slow, with 
Reuters describing the last decade as a near-paralysis exacerbated by a lack of drilling 
success, global drops in the price of oil and a deteriorating relationship with major oil 
companies (Eisenhammer 2018). The new president, João Lourenço, promised an economic 
miracle in the country when he won the 2017 presidential election. His administration has 
since then presented a more liberal approach to concession negotiations and relationships 
seem to be healing between the central government and the oil majors (Eisenhammer 
2018). However, current developments mean that projections of growth have taken another 
major hit due to the global pressure on the industry on account of the coronavirus. The virus 
has severely hurt the demand for, and the profitability of, oil and gas sector investments. 
Current projections estimate that the virus has led to the largest decline in energy 
investments in recorded history (IEA 2020).   
 
Angola has immense potential on account on its impressive resource endowment, 
which could, if properly utilized, lead it to become one of the most successful developing 
states in Africa. Additionally, it has access to gold, iron, copper, timber and vast agricultural 
and marine resources (Amundsen 2014). However, the country has also been heavily 
criticized for the way in which this development is occurring. Critics argue that the central 
government’s brand of elite-driven development has led to a highly centralized and affluent 
elite centered in the capital and a few other provinces integral to the oil sector. The rest of 
the country has seen very few benefits despite the country’s vast resources. Angola’s 
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poverty levels have been increasing, even as the country has witnessed impressive 
economic growth. It is estimated that around 70% of the population live in poverty, while 
30% are considered to be living in extreme poverty (Amundsen 2014). 94% of rural 
households are categorized as poor, with only 6% of those households having access to 
electricity (UNDP 2019). In the 2019 Human Development Index, the country is ranked at 
149 out of 189 countries with a score of 0,574. The country’s low scores primarily stem from 
its low life expectancy, high levels of poverty and relative high inequality (UNDP 2019). 
Angola also scores very low on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
where they are ranked at 146 out of 198 countries with a score of 26 out of 100 
(Transparency International 2019). However, there are also aspects of the resource curse 
that the country has largely been able to avoid. It has been argued that an abundance of 
natural resources leads to less opportunities for women. While this has certainly been true 
for most gulf state oil producers, Angola has been able to engage a significant percentage of 
its women into both its economy and ranking government positions (Ross 2012).      
 
Amundsen (2014) argues that the main reason Angola is suffering from the resource 
curse comes down to the poor quality of Angola’s institutions of redistribution. These 
institutions have helped facilitate the previously mentioned grabber-friendly behavior typically 
found in rentier states where elites capture resource rents. The undemocratic state 
institutions become the apparatus which elites use to enrich themselves. The vast majority of 
government revenues stem from Sonangol. An IMF report has indicated that as much as 
40% of the total government revenues are directly attributable to the company (Human 
Rights Watch 2004). This is problematic as billions of dollars in revenue, which is legally 
required to go to the Angolan national bank, has been able to illegally bypass this 
requirement. Hundreds of millions of dollars are also completely unaccounted for. The 
central government is complicit in this behavior and work to obfuscate how these funds are 
used or collected (Human Rights Watch 2004). After his 38-year presidency, José Eduardo 
dos Santos stepped down on the 25th of September 2017. In the aftermath he, along with 
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both his daughter and son, are now facing charges of illegal enrichment, money laundering 
and corruption among a number of other charges. The family is also known to have favored 
nepotism. Before losing power, the family advocated for a “dynastic solution” where power 
would be ceded to the president's son, with the daughter controlling many essential 
enterprises (Cascais 2018). The change of president has led to major personnel changes in 
key positions, as the new president attempts to better his party’s image. The new president 
adopts the approach so he can be perceived as tackling the widespread corruption. 
However, it still remains to be seen whether this is a genuine effort to improve the country’s 
situation or simply a changing of the “old guard” with party loyalists faithful to the new regime 
(Doctor 2018). Angola comes in at 119th out of 167 countries on “The Economist 2019 
Democracy index” with its electoral process, the functioning of government and civil liberties 
scoring particularly low (EIU 2019).  
   
Most of Angola’s oil resources, both offshore and onshore, are located in Cabinda 
which is an enclave separated from Angolan territory by the DRC. The province functions as 
an economic enclave with 60% of the nation’s oil production taking place there. The large 
industrial production has not helped the local population in Cabinda with estimates of local 
unemployment at 88%. The major oil companies in the region are staffed almost entirely by 
foreigners. Cabinda has seen repeated calls independence since Angola’s independence in 
1975. As Angola gained their independence, a separatist insurgency started in Cabinda led 
by the FLEC (Martin 1977). These voices still persist in the region today. Activists advocating 
for independence are silenced, and often jailed, by Angolan forces (TRTWorld 2019; Corpley 
2016). Angola exports 90% of its crude oil resources and currently has the capacity to refine 
only 20% of its resources itself (Hamilton 2011). A new refinery, which is set to open in 2021, 
will increase the country’s capability to be able to handle 80% of the country’s refining needs 
(Marques 2020). The amount of national oil exported, versus what it uses in domestic 
consumption, says a great deal about the country’s non-oil economy. Angola exports the 
vast majority of its oil. This shows the extent to which the economy is dependent on this 
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single industry and also demonstrates that the country lacks the economic capacity to 
effectively use its oil resources to fuel its own economic growth (Ross 2012). For all its oil, 
Angola is suffering hugely from regulatory hurdles in the form of red tape, hitches and pitfalls 
that can derail projects. This makes it one of the hardest places in the world to do business 
(Borgus & Ear 2012). Dutch disease effects are ever-present and evident through industrial 
stagnation, protectionism and a prevalence of uncompetitive exports that cannot be 
effectively transported because of a lack of skilled workforce. The rentier state patronage 
has been institutionalized and is manifested through corruption, mismanagement and 
widespread nepotism (Borgus & Ear 2012). In the 2020 World Bank “Doing Business index” 
the country is ranked at 177th out of 190 countries and scores particularly low on trade 
across borders and contract enforcement (World Bank 2020).  
 
4.2 Case B – High exposure, high resilience – The UAE   
Over the last fifty years, the UAE has undergone a radical transformation. The 
country has gone from being one of the least developed in the world, to becoming a global 
economic powerhouse, on par with the worlds industrialized nations (Shihab 2001). The 
rapid development has transformed the country from what was largely a deserted wasteland, 
to a booming modern economy. The turnaround has been predicated on the country’s 
effective use of fossil fuel revenues (Butt 2001). The UAE was established in 1971, a 
majority of the country’s oil deposits are found within the emirate of Abu Dhabi. Oil 
exploration in the country began in 1960 and is today controlled by ADNOC (ADNOC 2019). 
The country had only just begun developing its oil resources when it joined OPEC in 1967. 
Thus, the country was able to capitalize on the radically increasing profits when the 
organization initiated their negotiated cartelism, to limit the supply of crude oil on 
international energy markets in response to the Yom Kippur war in 1973 (Yergin 2011). The 
increasing windfalls boosted national revenues drastically and propelled the economic boom 
that has transformed the country. The increased profits have allowed the country to rely on 
oil rents to sustain economic development, thereby bypassing traditional stages of economic 
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development, such as capital accumulation to sustain economic growth (Shihab 2001). The 
period of sustained economic growth and prosperity, however, would come to an abrupt end. 
In response to the 1973 and 1979 oil embargos, the world’s developed economies reacted 
by implementing policies, such as rationing and increasing fuel efficiency, all geared toward 
limiting their dependence on foreign fossil fuels. The reduced demand would eventually hurt 
oil producers as it coincided with a gradual easing of tensions, and the stabilization and 
eventual normalization of the market (Yergin 2011). The mid-1980s saw OPEC’s strategies 
backfire as the stabilized markets led to collapsing oil prices (Haouas & Heshmati 2014). 
The Middle East was hit particularly hard, as regional oil revenues dropped by 75%, 
plummeting the region's oil-producing countries into recessions (Chaudhry 1997). 
 
In the last three decades, the UAE has been able to continue its remarkable 
economic growth. Statistics from 2015 indicate that it is the fourth-largest economy in the 
MENA-region (World Bank 2020). The country has become a major player in international 
energy markets. The UAE has access to the 7th largest proven oil and gas reserves in the 
world, and it is also the 7th largest producer globally (EIA 2019). Alongside this, The UAE 
economy is one of the fastest-growing in the world (Al-mulali & Che Normee Binti 2018) and 
unlike Angola, obtains a high UNDP Human Development Index score of 0.866, making it 
the 35th most developed country in the world (UNDP 2019). The country has also invested 
heavily to promote economic diversification and developing other industries; however, a 
significant portion of their economy is still centered around oil and gas industries. IMF 
projections indicate that oil and gas industries account for 31% of export revenue and 39% 
of national GDP, while fossil fuels also account for 65% of the government's revenues (El-
Katiri 2016). This level of dependence is still significant, although the country’s dependence 
is not as high as some of the other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) producers, such as 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The UAE government sought to actively stimulate non-oil 
sectors such as agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and financial services in a concerted 
attempt to limit their oil and gas dependence (El-Katiri 2016). Their efforts have been very 
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successful, evidenced by the country’s ability to grow these sectors. The manufacturing 
sector’s contribution as a portion of overall GDP has been significantly increased from 0.9 in 
1975 to 12.4 in 1998. There are also similar trends when it comes to agriculture and the 
service sector (Shihab 2001). These efforts have allowed the country to avoid or offset some 
of the most notorious Dutch disease effects, thereby ensuring that their non-oil and gas 
sectors maintain international competitiveness.  
 
 Developing national industries has drastically increased the number of migrant 
workers coming to the country. Expatriates now make up 75% of the country’s population, 
despite the fact that the oil and gas sectors only account for 1.6% of employment in the 
country (Shihab 2001). The UAE is very attractive to internationals due to its ability to 
provide high wages. HSBC’s 2019 “Explorer Expat survey” ranked the UAE as the 9th most 
attractive location in the world for expats, with the country scoring 3rd in expected wages 
and 1st in disposable income (HSBC Expat 2019). This is helped extensively by the low 
taxes in the country, however, there are also downsides to the influx of labor. The majority of 
the labor force is employed in service sector jobs. 98% of the private sector workforce is 
made up of expatriates. Some scholars have argued that the massive influx has created a 
two-layered employment system. This system produces extreme wealth inequality and 
insecurity for the expatriate workers that find themselves lowest on the employment ladder. 
A person’s attractiveness to employers is highly influenced by their nationality (Tong & Al 
Awad 2014). UAE nationals overwhelmingly choose to work within the public sector jobs 
because such jobs are associated with higher wages and increased job security. Nationals 
wanting public sector jobs feeds into another persistent problem. The country is facing high 
unemployment amongst nationals, with young job seekers being especially affected, the 
unemployment rate for nationals at 13% in 2011 (Dajani 2017).  
  
Any country that relies heavily on fossil fuel revenues has to be mindful of public 
spending. Unchecked public spending of oil revenues greatly increases the risk of rising 
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inflation, which can significantly hurt long-term growth prospects. Harrison (2010) identifies 
periods when the country has seen its spending result in higher inflation rates, especially in 
the period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. As oil prices hit record highs, the country 
received record oil rents and increased their spending instead of maintaining a healthy fiscal 
balance aimed at controlling inflation. Al-mulali & Che Sab (2011) indicate that the UAE’s 
real exchange rate is correlated to the oil price, meaning that any increase in the price of oil 
is likely to result in currency appreciation of the Dirham, the UAE’s currency. Higher oil 
prices lead to a rapid growth in liquidity, and more money flowing into the economy. The 
increased cash flow is likely to ramp up domestic spending, which is then expected to lead to 
higher inflation. The country currently has a fixed exchange rate system pegged to the US 
dollar. Al-mulali & Che Sab (2011) argue that this system has had a stabilizing effects on 
inflation up until 2002, but that the rising oil prices in the years after made fixed exchange 
rates an ineffective tool to ensure monetary stability. The existing system was unable to 
cope with a period of unprecedented price increases, which in turn rapidly increased the 
price of assets and resulted in rising inflation. Rising oil prices and government surpluses are 
a challenge for the government’s ability to manage its economic cycles. In the period 
between 2002-2008, the rising asset prices and rapidly increasing inflation had adverse 
effects in terms of increasing the cost of living (Al-mulali & Che Sab 2011). This showcases 
how even a highly developed country like the UAE can suffer from Dutch disease effects. 
However, it is important to note that the country only experienced adverse symptoms at 
record oil prices. The UAE still managed to maintain steady economic growth up until the 
financial crisis; this speaks to the relative stability and strength of the Dirham, as well as the 
UAE monetary system. 
 
The persistent issue for any fossil fuel-dependent state is the reliance on public 
spending as the primary engine used by the state to promote economic growth (El-katiri 
2016). This is very much the case for the UAE and is also, arguably, where they are most 
exposed to resource curse effects. Relying heavily on public spending can leave the 
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economy vulnerable to market fluctuations and the boom and bust cycle of international oil 
markets. In both the 1980s and 2014, the country struggled on account of decreasing oil 
prices which curtailed their ability to achieve economic growth. In situations like these, the 
government cannot afford to halt its spending even as its fossil fuel revenues fall. The 
country has an underdeveloped taxation system, which means that in downturn periods it 
lacks the safety of having other sources of income to fall back on. Instead, the state is forced 
to rely on its oil and gas revenues to maintain growth. The country has acknowledged this 
and has in response decided to build up a sovereign wealth fund to cover uncertain periods. 
The wealth fund is currently the third-largest in the world (SWFI 2020). The funds ensure 
that the state can tap into a dependable alternate source of funding to continue its public 
spending in times of unsettled oil and gas markets. 
 
The lack of a fully developed and sustainable taxation system has several 
downsides. In a modern taxation system, the government is held accountable to its citizens 
because of the taxes it collects. The UAE does not have this basis of trust and therefore 
appeases its citizens through public spending (Harrison 2010). A recent IMF report criticized 
GCC states for their reliance on oil incomes to increase national welfare. Instead, the report 
recommends that these countries work to implement modern tax-reforms and to strengthen 
financial institutions. Specifically, the report says these countries should incorporate income, 
corporate, consumption and value-added taxes (IMF 2019). The UAE has taken some steps 
in the right direction, such as adopting a 5% VAT tax (World Bank 2019). Still, the country’s 
taxation system is underdeveloped when compared to other developed nations within the 
same category of economic performance. These reforms are very unpopular within the 
population. Shifting obligations away from the state is complicated because many citizens 
regard the state as a provider, rather than a collector. These perceptions are grounded 
within the population and are subsequently hard to alter. Previous attempts to implement 
such reforms in fossil producing countries have led to popular protests and even riots. 
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Cutting back on fossil fuel subsidization and other societal benefits is linked to significant 
political risks for these governments (Aleagha, Birol & Ferroukhi 1995). 
 
The UAE is typically regarded as a very politically stable country. Despite this 
apparent stability, the country still has several significant anti-democratic characteristics, 
such as a lack of political freedom and a general ban on the formation of political parties 
(Rabobank 2013; Davidson 2006). The near-complete lack of democracy means that the 
country obtains a very low “Economist Democracy Index” score, coming in at 145th of the 
167 countries assessed (EIU 2019). Economic progress is helped immensely by a strong 
business environment and a relatively low rate of corruption. The ‘’Corruption Perception 
Index’’ ranks the country as 21st out of the 190 countries assessed (Transparency 
International 2019). A recent GAN corruption report has determined that the UAE has a 
moderate corruption risk, which could affect companies. While the country has a very 
business-friendly environment, there is still a reliance on local sponsors, and the local 
economy is routinely affected by interference from the royal family and its close allies. Their 
interference is a potential liability for international businesses (GAN 2018). Despite these 
potential drawbacks, the country still scores very highly on the 2020 “Doing business index” 
and is ranked 16 out of 190 countries (World bank 2020). Davidson (2006) has argued that 
the impressive development the UAE has been able to achieve comes as a consequence of 
its pre-existing political stability, maintained by the ruling family. Sheikh Khalifa has since 
taking power in 1966 taken advantage of the existing political system to ensure that he is 
kept in power through the “ruling bargain” (Davidson 2006). This is a norm-centered bargain 
amongst the ruling class and the country’s nationals where they maintain the existing 
system. In exchange for their loyalty the nationals receive benefits in the form of distributed 
wealth, economic or political benefits from the elites and the possibility of forming strategic 
alliances. This system of elite patronage maintains the ruler’s legitimacy and keeps them in 
power. 
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4.3 Comparative table – resource curse characteristics 
Resource curse characteristics Angola (A) The UAE (B) 
Rentier State behavior 
Ever-present, affecting 
all levels of governance 
Limited due to concerted 
government efforts 
Oil dependence Severe Moderate 
Dutch disease effects Severe Minimal 
Diversification Minimal Moderate 
Human Development Index score 149th of 189 35th of 189 
Democracy index score 119th of 167 145th of 167 
Business index score 177th of 190 16th of 190 
Corruption Index score 146th of 198 21st of 198 
 
5. Renewable developments 
5.1 Case A – Renewable developments in Angola 
Angola, as well as large parts of Africa, is in the midst of an energy crisis, which is 
particularly affecting Sub-Saharan Africa. In total, around 621 million people of Africa’s 1.1 
billion people lack access to electricity (UNEP 2017). In Angola, the national access to 
electricity is estimated at just 37%, and access to electricity is obstructed because power is 
often inaccessible, unaffordable and unreliable, leaving millions of people in energy poverty. 
In total, 13.12 million people lack access to electricity, mostly in rural areas (UNEP 2017). 
Africa is a continent with an abundance of available resources but a poor track record when 
it comes to developing them. Today the continent contributes to 3.3% of the annual energy-
related CO2 emissions. Simultaneously the continent is expected to be amongst the most 
adversely affected by climate change effects (UNEP 2017). In this respect, the emergence of 
renewables presents a credible alternative to traditional energy resources and a new 
pathway towards providing cheap and accessible energy to the poorest segments of the 
world's population (IRENA 2014). At the same time, it also ensures that these countries can 
pursue electrification and development, while also working to limit their emissions. Thus, 
transforming Africa’s energy systems has the potential to bring numerous benefits that can 
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alleviate resource curse effects. Sub-Saharan African countries rely heavily on traditional 
biomass to sustain their energy needs, with some countries having as much as 80% of the 
population using these energy sources to supply their own energy needs. Only a third of 
hospitals in Sub-Saharan Africa have access to reliable electricity (UNEP 2017). As we have 
noted earlier, these issues are also severe in Angola, with only 6% of the rural population 
having adequate access to electricity (UNDP 2019). Developing renewables energy can 
assist the country in providing electricity beyond the regions that have been important to the 
oil and gas industry, while in the process, ensuring that these areas can develop 
independently of such sectors. The South African region is especially vulnerable to 
increasingly severe cyclical floods and droughts, decreasing water availability, land 
degradation, desertification and reduced biodiversity. Together these challenges could 
seriously impede the region’s ability to maintain both development and food security (Lotz-
Sisitka & Urquhart 2014). 
 
The continent has an immense renewable potential, with nearly unlimited potential 
solar capability (10TW) as well as substantial untapped hydro and wind power (350GW and 
110GW, respectively) (UNDP 2017). Angola alone has access to an estimated 18.200 MW 
of hydro-powered energy, although so far, only 1200 MW has been developed (IHA 2017). In 
2015, hydropower contributed just 2,5% of total electricity (UNDP 2017). The new president, 
João Lourenço, has shown a willingness to tackle the issue of lacking access to electricity 
through his new plan “Angola Energy Vision: 2025”. His administration has embarked on a 
new ambitious new political agenda centered primarily around renewable energy. The new 
plan maps out a strategy towards developing the country’s energy sector towards increasing 
national generation capacity and extending the grid to rural areas. The long term goal is to 
further economic development and diversification of the national economy (MINEA 2020). 
The plan aims to provide electricity to 60% of the population, up from 30% today, and to 
bring electricity to rural communities and towns that currently have no access at all. The 
plan, which is being overseen by the Ministry of Energy and Water, is mainly focused on 
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developing the country’s hydropower capabilities thereby ensuring that Angola’s power 
generation becomes 70% renewable (MINEA 2020). 
 
The Angolan government’s long-term plans of massively ramping up their generation 
capacity will encompass both renewable and conventional energy technologies. The goal set 
by the new plan is to increase the country’s installed energy capacity to 9.900 MW by 2025. 
This will primarily be achieved through the continued development of hydropower projects, 
which will account for 66% of the new capacity, in the process increasing from 1200 MW to 
9000 MW (FHI 2017). The plan also entails developing conventional forms of energy, where 
natural gas will account for 19% and non-hydropower renewable sources will make up 7.5% 
to produce 800 MW of electricity (AFDB 2017). The plan also emphasizes strategic goals of 
developing cross-border electricity projects to boost interconnectivity. The Angolan and 
Namibian 2021 Baynes Dam project on the Cunene River is expected to provide 300 MW to 
each country respectively. Projects like these are vital to increasing regional energy 
connectivity, thereby making it easier to further sustainable energy development since 
renewables are dependent on interconnectivity to function optimally (Goodrich 2020). 
Hydropower projects are also being developed independently on rivers such as, Capunda 
(330 MW), Dala (440 MW), Cafula (520 MW). However, the most ambitious projects in 
development are found in the country’s largest river, Kwanza, with two major dams currently 
in development, Laúca (2,070 MW) and Caculo Cabaça (2,170 MW). Together these 
projects will generate power equal to 70% of the country’s current total installed capacity 
(IHA 2017). 
 
 Climate change mitigation relies heavily on scaling up the use of new low-carbon 
energy technologies. Decreasing greenhouse gas emissions by developing electricity 
sectors is crucial to mitigating some of the worst impacts of climate change and renewables 
have a vital role to play in this transformation (Aklin 2018; Gross 2020). In the process, these 
technologies can also shift the country away from its current resource-led development, 
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which has worked to exacerbate Dutch disease effects and has led to the increased 
inequality and poverty that is evident in the country today. However, for Angola, progress is 
hindered by a lack of understanding, limited availability of adequately trained professionals, 
gaps in national institutional capacity to develop their sources effectively, poor financial 
coordination and a tendency to misuse funds. Progress is also hindered by the inadequacy 
of climate change information that is accessible to the public in Portuguese (Lotz-Sisitka & 
Urquhart 2014). There are also unique challenges when developing renewable technologies. 
Popular resistance to these technologies is a persistent issue that can affect both voters and 
governments. In some cases, local opposition to renewables has resulted in weaker 
electoral results for pro-renewable policymakers (Stokes 2015). Additionally, there are 
inherent spatial and environmental concerns associated with developing wind and solar 
energy systems in their increased land usage. These technologies require ten times the 
space of coal and natural gas-fired power plants to generate the same energy (Gross 2020). 
Renewable energies in developing countries, more so than in a developed one, are 
dependent on broad government support from advocates in both civil society and 
government, who see their potential to reduce CO2 emission and produce local job 
opportunities. It is also reliant on the necessary political capacity to sufficiently mobilize 
political support to push for their development (Rennkamp et.al 2017). 
 
The progress that is being made towards electrification means that Angola, and 
many African countries like it, have the ability to leapfrog certain technological which have 
traditionally halted progress and facilitated resource curse effects, by instead relying on 
modern renewable solutions (IRENA 2019). From a national electrification perspective, this 
provides these countries with a wider variety of cost-effective opportunities when deciding on 
how to develop their energy systems. In the case of Angola, policymakers have shaped 
policy to focus attention away from traditional energy systems by focusing on low-carbon 
and renewable alternatives (AFDB 2019). Angola’s high dependence on oil and high levels 
of youth unemployment make it especially vulnerable to the negative effects of the energy 
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transition. In the short-term, Angola faces a great challenge, which if left unchecked, could 
detrimentally affect the economy as the world lessens its demand for oil and gas products. 
Over the long run, however, countries who take the right steps, such as promoting national 
economic diversification, can limit their vulnerability, and Angola’s plans to use renewables 
could create a more stable and equitable economy for their citizens (IRENA 2019).  
 
There are many associated benefits with limiting national economic exposure. This 
includes a higher probability of long-term growth prospects, since commodity price 
fluctuations become less important. The world has witnessed a 25% reduction in demand for 
oil and gas since March, which has seriously hurt fossil fuel producing countries (IEA 2020). 
Another benefit vital to further non-oil sector development is reducing potential Dutch 
disease effects and building up non-oil industries to spur job growth (IRENA 2019). 
Diversifying national economies is one of the most consequential tools available for states 
attempting to limit their oil sector dependence. When countries take concrete actions to 
ensures that the threat of Dutch disease effects are limited, it often leads to a boost for non-
oil sectors (Karl 2007). Taking this course of action is likely to produce lasting benefits. 
Limiting Dutch disease effects means stopping the traditional brain drain where skilled labor 
is transferred from non-oil sectors into the oil-sector. Diversifying could also help alleviate 
the country’s rapid trend of centralization by making rural areas more prone for economic 
development. Shifting the economy away from the economic enclaves currently sustaining 
the economy so that less developed areas become more viable, is vital to decreasing 
inequality (Burgos & Ear 2012).  
 
As previously stated, the oil industry is capital intensive, while requiring relatively less 
labor. Currently, there are no significant benefits of the oil industry which is accruing to the 
local population (Amundsen 2014) Renewables technologies, because of their 
characteristics, are likely to create jobs that benefit the Angolan population. Renewable 
energy projects require a substantial amount of workers to build, maintain and operate them. 
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The renewable transition is estimated to create over 11 million energy sector jobs by 2050 
globally, while also providing intrinsic benefits associated with providing reliable electricity to 
a larger part of the country (IRENA 2019). These regions become more susceptible to 
further economic development. Increasing the viability of commerce and the availability of 
jobs in rural areas is vital if the country is to continue its development and pursue long-term 
goals of reducing unemployment, especially amongst the nation’s youth.  
 
Diversifying away from oil dependence is also likely to better Angola’s tumultuous 
relationship with oil-related conflicts. The country has seen both a war for interdependence 
and a civil war that were largely determined by the control of fossil fuel assets (Amundsen 
2014). Tensions are not likely to disappear as long as the fundamental dependence on one 
sector persists, along with the capability to enrich those in power. Since the civil war, the 
country has enjoyed relative stability because there has not been a group capable of 
challenging the central power structure. However, as evidenced by the case of Venezuela, 
(Jankovic et al. 2019) a prolonged period of stability does not mean that tensions are 
incapable of rising again. Especially now as the country is getting accustomed to a new 
president, which is in the process of replacing much of the personnel that previously held 
power (Doctor 2018). 
 
The main challenge associated with the resource curse that is likely to hold back the 
development of renewable energy in Angola is the continued prevalence of the rentier state. 
The Angolan rentier state is characterized by wide-ranging corruption, which is adversely 
affecting nearly all pillars of society (Amundsen 2014). This behavior has been intrinsic to 
the country for decades and has produced a national culture of corruption and self-
enrichment. This poses a series of challenges as Angola now attempts to work towards a 
more effective and equitable allocation of resource rents that benefit the population to a 
greater extent. Corruption is a significant problem for many African nations and persists, 
even as policy initiatives are implemented to stop it (Hope 2017). For Angola, the socio-
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economic and governance challenges that corruption poses are likely to persist, even if 
renewable energy is developed. Systemic corruption significantly hurts the credibility of 
democratic institutions, opposes and actively combats good governance, destroys 
confidence in administrative bodies and political processes, exacerbates inequality while 
impoverishing communities, and reduces both educational and employment opportunities 
(Hope 2017). These are immense hurdles that the country will have to tackle, in a long-term 
perspective. The new energy plan charted out by the central government is a promising first 
step towards achieving the ambitious goal of sustainable development. Going forward, the 
success of this energy plan will depend on the new president and his cabinet, as well as 
their ability and genuineness in pursuing diversification efforts. The elite-level corruption that 
stems from oil and gas dependence cannot be tackled solely through developing renewable 
energy sources. However, these technologies still have a vital role to play in terms of 
building a more robust economy, which in the long-term, could foster societal change 
towards more responsible governance. 
 
Angola is suffering from a broad range of resource curse characteristics, 
predominantly its lack of economic diversification, wide-spread rentier state behavior and 
corruption, lack of development, enclave production and lacking educational and 
employment opportunities for nationals. Developing renewable energy technologies can 
grant access to electricity to new areas outside of those vital to the oil and gas sectors, while 
also providing these regions with new employment opportunities and priming them for further 
economic development. In the long run, these changes are likely to produce more 
opportunities for Angolan nationals. Developing renewables also shifts the country further 
away from its current enclave production where foreign elites in Luanda see the majority of 
the development benefits that stem from the oil and gas industry, while working to ensure 
that Angola’s distribution of its resource rents become more equitable.  
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5.2 Case B  – Renewable developments  – the UAE  
The Arabian Gulf is starting to feel the effects associated with climate change. The 
number of yearly cold days and nights, measured in average temperatures, has been rapidly 
decreasing since 1960 (Al-Maamary et. al 2017). The UAE, along with other GCC states, are 
becoming increasingly aware of the threats and challenges posed by a rapidly transforming 
climate. Adverse climate effects have the potential to radically alter the gulf’s period of 
growth, wealth and prosperity. These impacts will be multifaceted, however, the primary 
concerns stem from a lack of precipitation and rising average temperatures (Al-Maamary et. 
al 2017). These new realities are coinciding with an immense population boom, that is both 
boosting overall population and leading citizens to flock towards urban areas (Said, Alshehhi 
& Mehmood 2018). The growing population density and increasing living standards are 
altering habits and electricity use. In 2012, the average CO2-consumption in GCC countries 
was four times the global average, and the massive increases are facilitated by GCC 
countries electricity and fuel subsidization. GHG emissions in the Gulf Peninsula have 
increased by 121% between 1994 and 2004 (Al-Maamary et. al 2017). 
  
In response to the environmental challenges, the UAE has sought to chart out a new 
path. In 2017, the country launched “Energy Strategy 2050”, the first unified energy strategy 
in its history (UAE 2020). The strategy aims to radically increase the country’s renewable 
energy generation capacity to 50% clean energy by 2050, decrease the country’s national 
carbon footprint from power generation by 70%, and increase energy efficiency by 40% for 
individuals and corporations (UAE 2020). The strategy aims to build up a diverse mix of 
energy systems: 44% will stem from renewable energy sources, 38% from gas, 12% from 
coal and 6% from nuclear energy plants. To achieve its goals, the government will invest 
AED 600 billion in new energy projects (UAE 2020). The shift towards sustainability is 
outlined further in the country’s largest emirate, Abu Dhabi whose national development 
plan, “Economic Vision 2030” outlines an economic action plan consisting of developing a 
sustainable and diversified economy that intends to further reduce the national dependence 
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on oil (ADCED 2008). The plan’s number one policy priority is developing a sustainable 
economy through non-oil focused sector development. Diversifying away from current 
energy systems is seen as a key strategy to achieving these goals, while also ensuring 
future energy security (ADCED 2008).  
 
The country’s second-largest emirate Dubai has also presented a national energy 
strategy “Dubai Clean Energy Strategy 2050”. The plan was launched to ensure that Dubai 
positions itself to become an international pioneer in terms of developing its renewable 
energy sector (DEWA 2020). The emirate will increase renewable output to 7% (1500 MW) 
of total energy capacity by the end of 2020, and renewable output is then expected be 
increased further with goals of 25% by 2030, and 75% by 2050 (IRENA 2015). The plan also 
aims to decrease the overall demand for water and energy by 30% by 2030 and to reduce 
carbon emission by 19% before the end of the year. These ambitious plans place Dubai as 
the most ambitious renewable energy developer within the UAE (DEWA 2020). The country 
has also chosen to develop four nuclear power plants with a combined generation capacity 
of 5.6GW (Sgouridis et. al 2016). When finished, these plants are expected to meet around 
20% of national power demand (IRENA 2015).  
 
The UAE’s pivot towards renewable energies comes as a consequence of the 
industry’s increased competitiveness and rapidly declining prices. Developing renewable 
energy is seen as a way to further the national diversification process to limit dependence on 
oil and gas sectors, while also limiting national reliance on high-cost natural gas for 
electricity production (Jamil, Ahmad & Jeon 2016). Introducing modern renewable energy 
technologies into the energy mix helps alleviate resource curse effects by bringing both 
environmental and economic benefits to the UAE as they are projected to increase national 
GDP and produce new job opportunities (Said, Alshehhi & Mehmood 2018; Sgouridis et. al 
2016). The country grew its renewable energy portfolio by over 400% in the last decade and 
is on track to repeat that again in the coming decade. The central government is also 
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investing heavily in carbon capture and storage facilities (Nehme 2020). Abu Dhabi’s newest 
2GW solar project, ‘’Al Dhafra’’, is projected to begin construction in 2021 and is estimated to 
produce power at a world record low 1.35 cents per kwh (Dudley 2020). When finished, the 
project is set to become one of the largest in the world and will produce enough power to 
provide electricity for 160,000 households (Dudley 2020). By 2030, the country projects to 
have 30.000 MW of installed renewable energy (Malik et. al 2019). 
 
There are many reasons for the UAE to alter their energy strategies towards 
emphasizing energy efficiency and renewable technologies. The rapid economic and 
demographic changes that the country is going through are pushing the existing electricity 
infrastructure to its limits, resulting in the UAE having to import energy from neighboring 
countries to ensure electricity at peak hours (Jamil, Ahmad & Jeon 2016). Increasing the 
generation capacity, while also diversifying energy systems is likely to bring several benefits 
and help decrease the risk of Dutch disease effects. IRENA has calculated that increasing 
the share of renewable energy in the total energy mix by just 10% could lead to annual 
savings in the region of $1.9 billion by 2030 (IRENA 2015). Taking advantage of a variety of 
renewable energy systems, primarily solar and wind energy, presents a fossil fuel extension 
strategy that allows the country to receive a higher price for its oil and gas products 
(Sgouridis et. al 2016). Boosting renewable generation capacity reduces the domestic 
demand for oil and gas and limits consumption; subsequently, the UAE will be able to sell 
more oil and gas on international markets. Developing renewables is estimated to reduce 
domestic consumption of oil by between 8.5 and 15.5%, returns as high as 20% could be 
realized on their renewable energy projects in liberated oil exports alone (IRENA 2015). 
When health and environmental benefits are taken into account, the same report indicates 
that these measures could result in savings up to $3.7 billion (IRENA 2015).  
 
There are also wider societal benefits of developing non-oil sectors. Building up non-
oil sectors reduces the risk of potential Dutch disease effects and is likely to result in new 
46 
high-paying jobs. If properly prioritized, non-oil industries have an immense potential to spur 
major economic growth for oil-dependent countries (IRENA 2019). This is also true for the 
UAE. Developing renewable energy projects increases the national emphasis on 
sustainability as these projects command national attention. In addition, it provides socio-
economic benefits, especially due to their potential to bring growth and employment 
opportunities to rural areas. Renewable energy projects are likely to spur job growth rurally 
where jobs are traditionally scarce (Said, Alshehhi & Mehmood 2018). 
 
The UAE has enormous potential for renewable energy technologies, primarily 
through solar energy. The country receives an average of 10 hours of sunlight a day, as well 
as around 350 days of sun a year (Sgouridis et. al 2016; IRENA 2015). There are also major 
environmental gains that can be achieved; increasing the renewable energy generation 
capacity by 5% nationally is projected to result in a 7% reduction in CO2 emissions (Said, 
Alshehhi & Mehmood 2018). Present challenges that hinder further development of 
renewables are national perceptions about issues relating to renewable technologies. Cost-
competitiveness, grid intermittency, desalination concerns, fossil fuel subsidization and 
inconsistencies in the regulatory framework are all reasons why some segments of the 
population remain unsure about their development (Al-Amir & Abu-Hijleh 2013; IRENA 
2015). These energy challenges can be substantially mitigated by developing strategies and 
policy initiatives that highlight the dangers of dependence on fossil fuels and its associated 
resource curse effects. Additionally, the new realities associated with renewables needs to 
be presented so that a more holistic approach to investments and policies can be conducted. 
Solar technology is able to compete with fossil fuels in the UAE, but a decade of 
conventional thinking that prioritizes fossil fuels hurts their viability and popularity. Currently, 
the lack of awareness presents a bigger challenge to further renewable development than 
current cost levels (Sgouridis et. al 2016). The desert landscape also ensures that spatial 
issues, which were highlighted in the Angola case, are less of a concern, however there are 
greater institutional hindrances. The UAE utilizes price controls to ensure that its population 
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has sufficient access to cheap energy and national fuel consumption subsidies were 
estimated to cost the UAE 21.8 billion dollars in 2011 (Sgouridis et. al 2016). The national 
government fails to consider the total costs associated with various energy systems, as well 
as their ability to provide wider societal benefits. Instead, governmental subsidization 
protects the status quo, as companies refrain from considering other forms of energy. There 
are no incentives for companies to even consider these technologies because their energy 
needs are fulfilled at sub-market rates (Sgouridis et. al 2016). 
 
The UAE has proved that it possesses the necessary institutional capacity to 
effectively manage resource curse characteristics. The government has allocated its 
resource rents in ways that promote economic diversification, build up non-oil sectors and 
limit Dutch disease effects. Renewable energy technologies provide a pathway toward 
fulfilling these goals, while also ensuring the country can further its sustainability agenda and 
strengthen national energy independence. Growing energy consumption coincides with 
increased environmental threats that pose a credible challenge to GCC states. There is an 
urgent need to focus on building capable technologies to be able to meet these challenges 
(Malik et. al 2019). The UAE, as the first GCC member, is realizing the issues inherent in 
relying on fossil fuel energy systems. Appearing progressive on climate change issues also 
provides a boost to the national public image vital in an era where oil and gas production is 
becoming increasingly controversial. Developing renewable energy technologies provides 
both economic and societal benefits in both the long and short term, while also helping the 
country keep its resource curse effects in check. Simultaneously, these technologies further 
the national plans of economic diversification and provide non-oil sector employment 
opportunities that could help the country tackle its youth unemployment issues. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to answer the following research question: To what extent 
are Angola and The UAE, countries with differing exposure and resilience, both able 
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to utilize the energy transition to lessen fossil fuel dependence and promote 
economic diversification? By doing so, it endeavors to showcase that renewable energy 
technologies can present a credible pathway forward for fossil fuel producing countries.  
 
This thesis concludes that the transition towards renewable energy is both an 
important and necessary tool for countries to limit their dependence on fossil fuels and 
promote economic diversification. The two case studies outlined highlight an emphatic case 
of how countries with various financial, as well as institutional and political capacities, can 
utilize these technologies effectively. In the case of Angola, renewable energy provides a 
credible path for the country to develop its non-oil sectors, thus limiting its relative exposure 
toward its oil and gas sector. It also provides substantial opportunities to extend the grid and 
provide electricity to millions of Angolans, while in the process priming these areas for further 
economic development. The emphasis on renewable technology also has the potential to 
provide increased job opportunities for Angolan nationals, thus helping the country tackle its 
problem with unemployment. In the case of the UAE, renewables are route towards limiting 
dependence on the fossil fuel industry and helping limit national reliance on gas for 
electricity. The country will also be able to create jobs in rural areas and allocate resource 
rents in a way that helps to facilitate a smoother energy transition away from fossil fuels in 
the future. The two case studies illustrate how renewables play a significant role when it 
comes to limiting resource curse effects. Both in their ability to diversify away from oil 
dependency, and also because of their ability to promote sustainable development that 
stimulates growth in non-oil sectors and leads to an emergence of new jobs. This thesis has 
endeavored to showcase how renewables can build on the existing literature on the resource 
curse and economic nationalism, by highlighting their potential to lessen some of the 
associated issues identified by such scholars. 
 
The thesis has, because of its limited scope, not been able to address several issues 
that could better help our understanding of the resource curse. The importance of this topic 
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will only increase in importance as climate change effects become more prominent, as will 
the need to tackle resource curse characteristics for affected countries. Building on these 
findings, new research should focus on mapping out the institutional structures that can help 
facilitate a more effective transition towards renewables. The two cases outlined differ widely 
in their economic, institutional and political make-up and capacity, thus further research 
should be conducted so the proper impacts of state institutions in facilitating this transition 
can be understood. 
 
Renewables are becoming increasingly important in international energy markets, 
even to the point that the industry’s own growth estimates were severely underestimated, 
with price reductions first thought to be reachable by 2020, arriving as early as 2014 
(Sgouridis et. al 2016). Based on the industries current trajectory, projections for 2030 are 
perhaps already understated. As the new reality surrounding renewables becomes clearer, 
and realities about the climate become harder to ignore, these technologies are likely to 
become even more important for countries looking for opportunities to fulfill their future 
energy needs. As evidenced by the immense cost-reductions, which have occurred in the 
last ten years, the scaling up of this industry still has untapped potential, for instance when 
small-scale personalized systems, such as solar panels suitable for homes become price-
competitive. 
 
The world is becoming increasingly aware of the need to respond meaningfully to the 
urgent issue of climate change and its associated issues; however, there are still persistent 
constraints affecting countries’ energy-decisions. The status quo, which this thesis 
understands as business-as-usual, incremental decision-making within limited frameworks, 
is helping to promote investments into traditional fossil fuel infrastructure (Olson & 
Lenzemann 2016). The current trajectory is not only environmentally detrimental, it also 
continues to reinforce the dominant energy systems, which has for a long time produced 
energy winners and losers. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Gulf Region are both bearing the 
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brunt of these burdens in which the status quo continues to protect. On the other hand, 
renewables present a different trajectory and creates further alternatives for countries, 
regardless of their economic capacity. The industry’s rapidly changing perceptions are 
solidifying this reality, with an increasing number of renewable energy applications – which 
have previously been unattainable due to cost – now becoming cost-effective and sensible 
development paths. When decisions are made within narrowly confined frameworks, that are 
predisposed to see intrinsic value in fossil fuels, this also shapes the public perception to 
devalue renewable technologies, despite the insurmountable price-tag associated with 
inaction on climate change (Olson & Lenzemann 2016). 
 
The way forward must incorporate plans that aim to transform global energy systems 
by embracing the need for sustainability. Economic planning has to be predicated on holistic 
thinking that envisions development beyond simply privileging economic factors. These 
plans also must take into account the special relationship that exists between the fossil fuel 
industry and national governments. This industry benefits from the relationship in the form of 
subsidies, special privileges and protections (Yergin 2011) and these aspects greatly boost 
the longevity of fossil fuels as reliable and profitable investments. The IMF estimates that the 
world spent $5.2 trillion (6.5 % of GDP) on fossil fuel subsidies in 2017 (IMF 2019). $634 
billion of these funds are provided as direct energy sector subsidies, of which 70% is given 
to fossil fuel industries (Taylor 2019). Within this framework, it is not difficult to understand 
the entrenched power possessed by fossil fuel industries. While there are spatial, 
intermittent and material limitations that prevent renewables from single-handedly 
maintaining large scale energy grids, they still present a vital path towards modernizing 
energy systems and limiting global emissions.  
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